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Dunn: FIRST AMENDMENT

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Parkhouse v. Stringer'
(decided August 19, 2008)
Virginia Parkhouse, a volunteer for the nonprofit community
group Landmark West!, filed an application to repeal a subpoena
served by the Department of Investigation ("DOI").2 The New York
County Supreme Court ordered Parkhouse to comply with the subpoena. 3 On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, addressed whether the DOI had the authority to subpoena Parkhouse
during the course of their investigation, 4 and if so, whether her statements at a New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission
("LPC") were entitled to freedom of speech protection under the Federal Constitution 5 or the New York Constitution. 6 The appellate division held that the DOI had the authority to subpoena Parkhouse, and
that compliance did not constitute a violation of Parkhouse's right to
free speech.7
One of Parkhouse's duties as a volunteer of Landmark West!
was to testify at public hearings before the LPC, which was charged
863 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008).
2

Id. at 403.

3 Id.
4 Id. at 402.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I, states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ......
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8, states, in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely speak.., and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech."
7 Parkhouse,863 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
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with identifying and designating historic landmarks in New York
City. 8 On October 17, 2006, LPC held a public hearing to determine

whether to give landmark status to the Dakota Stables and New York
Cab Company Stables. 9 Two months earlier, in August, Borough
President Scott M. Stringer wrote a letter in support of granting
landmark status, but he later changed his mind without notifying the
LPC and revoked his support for the landmark designation before the
hearing. 10

However, at the hearing, Parkhouse voluntarily read

Stringer's statement, which she altered from its original form.1 ' She
then submitted the altered letter without noting that she was the one
12
who modified the letter.
Following the hearing, Stringer's attorney informed the LPC
that Parkhouse did not have the authority to speak on his behalf, and
threatened further legal action.1 3 The LPC filed a complaint with the
DOI in February 2007, alleging misrepresentation. 14 The DOI then
began an investigation and attempted to interview Parkhouse."5 After
Parkhouse refused the interview, she was served with a subpoena,
which she moved to quash. 16 In response, the First Deputy Commissioner for the DOI noted that there were still unanswered questions

8 Id. at 402.

9 Id.
1o Id. The original letter stated, in pertinent part: "I ask that you move to calendar these
two buildings and protect an important part of the history of the development of the Upper
West Side." Id. at 403.
11 Id. at 403. The altered letter stated, in pertinent part: "I ask that you immediately protect
the important part of history of the Upper West Side and landmark these buildings." Id.
12 Parkhouse,863 N.Y.S.2d. at 403.
"3 Id. at 403.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 id.
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that remained for Parkhouse that would assist the DOI in future "policy and procedural recommendations.'

17

Parkhouse asserted that the subpoena violated her free speech
rights under the U.S. Constitution and the New York State Constitution because it had a chilling effect and forced her to explain the reasoning behind her statements, which she classified as political
speech.18 The First Department disagreed, concluding that her rights
were not violated because the investigation was not aimed at the content of her speech.1 9
The subject of the DOI's investigation in Parkhouse regarded
the procedures of the LPC, which permit individuals to misrepresent
their affiliations with public officials, and not the content of Parkhouse's testimony.20 Accordingly, the court stated that their ruling
could actually encourage speech, by allowing the DOI investigation
to continue to ensure the legitimacy of the proceedings, and thus providing an incentive for citizens to participate in the public hearings.21
In addition, the court noted that Parkhouse had no First
Amendment right to misrepresent herself as authorized to speak on
Borough President Stringer's behalf.2 2 The court reasoned that "she

does not have a constitutionally protected right to disseminate false
17 Parkhouse,863 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
18 Id. at 404-05.

19 Id. at 405. The United States Supreme Court in 1972 interpreted the First Amendment
as meaning that "government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
20 Parkhouse, 863 N.Y.S.2d at 405 ("DOI is not conducting a content-based inquiry by
investigating or condemning the actual words spoken by petitioner or other participants at
the hearing.").
21 Id. at 406.
22 Id. at 405.
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On the other hand, the court, quot-

ing John Stuart Mill extolling the merits of free speech, said that, "
'[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who
hold it.'

,24

The key word in Mill's statement was "opinion," which

raised a question in Parkhouse of whether she was stating an opinion
25
or rather falsely misrepresenting herself.
The Parkhouse Court relied partly on the United States Supreme Court case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 26 which addressed this issue of content-neutral speech. In Ward, there was a
dispute between Rock Against Racism ("RAR"), a group claiming to
be " 'dedicated to the espousal and promotion of anti-racist views,' "
and the City of New York.27 RAR held annual programs of rock music and speeches at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in Central
Park.28 The city had repeatedly received complaints about the excessive noise at these concerts, and RAR refused to comply with the requests of city officials to reduce the volume. 29 In 1985, the city refused to grant RAR permission to hold their concert in the Bandshell,
citing the repeated problems with noise and disruptive crowds.3 ° In
response, RAR filed suit against the mayor, police and parks depart23 Id. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) ("Spreading false information
in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials.").
24 Parkhouse,863 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
25 Id. at 405.

26 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
27 Id. at 784.
28 Id. at 781.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 785.
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ment officials, and the City of New York, but the parties settled and
in exchange for a permit, RAR agreed to comply with all regulations.31
After learning that the city retained an independent sound
technician for the event, RAR returned to court and moved for an injunction against enforcement of certain "sound-amplification" guidelines.32 The injunction was granted, and RAR's 1986 concert, using
their own sound technician, resulted in several excessive noise complaints.33 After the concert, RAR amended their complaint seeking to
strike down the guidelines. 3a The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
"clarify the legal standard applicable to governmental regulation of
the time, place, or manner of protected speech.,

35

The Court created

a benchmark in which the government can restrict speech, but only if
the restrictions are: (1) not in regards to the content of the speech; (2)
narrowly tailored to further an important government interest; and (3)
36
leave open alternate means of communication.
The Court also defined the concept of "content neutral" as it
relates to First Amendment challenges. 37 The primary question in determining content neutrality is whether the speech regulation occurred because the government disagreed with the message of the
speech.38 The main consideration must be the purpose of the gov-

31 Ward, 491 U.S. at 785.
32 Id. at 787.
13 Id. at 788.
34 Id.

31 Id. at 789.
36

Ward, 491 U.S. 791.

37 id.

38 Id.
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ernment in enacting the restriction.39 If the reason for regulating the
speech was completely unrelated to the content of the speech, it is
deemed to be content neutral, regardless of any ancillary effect on
some speakers or messages.4 ° In Ward, the purpose of the sound
guideline was to maintain reasonable sound levels at Bandshell
events in order to avoid disturbing the surrounding residences, and
not to censor any specific ideas.41
The second consideration is whether the regulation is " 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.' ,,42
The
Court determined that the city's interest in quality sound for the performances in the Bandshell was both reasonable and significant.43
Poor sound quality diminished the quality of the performances and
44
disrupted the citizens of New York City.
The third consideration requires that the government leave
open alternate routes of communication. 45 The Court found that this
requirement was easily met, because the city's guidelines did not restrict the content of the expression, rather they merely regulated the

39 id.
40 id.
41 Ward, 491

U.S. at 792.
42 Id. at 796 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)). "The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that they are
deemed to be 'fundamental rights' and that generally the government cannot infringe them
unless strict scrutiny is met; that is, the government's action must be necessary to achieve a
compelling purpose." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 815 (2d ed. 2005).
41 Ward, 491 U.S. at 796.

44 Id. at 797, 800 n.7 ("[T]he city seeks to eliminate-excessive and inadequate sound amplification-and eliminates them without at the same time banning or significantly restricting
a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same evils. This is the essence of
narrow tailoring.").
41 Id. at 802.
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volume of the sound.46
Based on these three factors, the Court held that the sound
amplification guidelines were valid as a form of reasonable regulation of the place and manner of speech under the First Amendment. 4
While the dissent agreed with the majority's enumeration of the stan48
dard for evaluating the constitutionality of governmental guidelines,
its main contention was with their interpretation of the narrow tailoring requirement, or rather, their disregard for it. 49 The dissent argued

that the real definition of narrow tailoring, as expressed through
precedent, required the Court to examine the alternate methods of
serving a legitimate government interest and whether the benefits of
the regulation carry more weight than the burden it places on the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.5 ° In contrast, the majority
only required the government to show that the regulation effectively
served the government's interest. 51 The dissent stated that the enacted regulation was more restrictive than necessary, reasoning that
the city in this instance could have served their goals just as effectively and without intruding on protected speech by simply punishing
RAR for breaking their rules.52
A few years earlier, the United States Supreme Court decided

46 Id.
41 Id. at 803.
48 Ward, 491 U.S. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49 Id.

'o Id. at 805.
"' Id. at 806.
52 Id. at 807. ("By holding that the Guidelines are valid time, place, and manner restrictions, notwithstanding the availability of less intrusive but effective means of controlling
volume, the majority deprives the narrow tailoring requirement of all meaning. Today, the
majority enshrines efficacy but sacrifices free speech.") (footnote omitted).
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a similar case in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.5 3 Renton
involved a zoning ordinance which prohibited" 'adult motion picture
theater[s]' from [being] within 1,000 feet of any residential zone[s],
single-or multiple-family dwellings, church[es],
54

within one mile of any school[s].

or park[s], and

Playtime Theaters, Inc. ("Play-

time") challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it violated the
First Amendment protection of freedom of speech. 55
The Court described the ordinance as a time, place, and manner regulation and used the same standard set forth in Ward.5 6 The
first requirement, that the speech be content-neutral, garnered strong
disagreements among the divided Court. The majority initially proclaimed that the ordinance was neither content-based nor contentneutral, before declaring that it was content-neutral.5 7

The Court

stated that the ordinance did not meet their definition of a contentbased speech regulation, reasoning it did "not contravene the fundamental principle that underlies our concern about 'content-based'
speech regulations: that 'government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.' 558
Additionally, the Court addressed whether the ordinance was
enacted to serve an important governmental interest. 59 It decided affirmatively that the interest was

"

preserv[ing] the quality of urban

" 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
14 Id. at 44.
5 Id. at 45.
56 Id. at 46-47.
17 id. at 47.
58 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96).
" Id. at 50.
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life.' ,,60 The Court found that adult theaters have a harmful effect on
61
the surrounding area and contribute to "neighborhood blight.",
Moreover, the Court determined that the ordinance left open
alternative routes of communication. 62 The ordinance left open about
five percent of the total city of Renton to use as adult theater sites.63
Playtime argued that it was practically impossible for them to operate
an adult film theater within the parameters of the ordinance, as there
were practically no " 'commercially viable' " sites available after the

restrictions. 64 However, the Court held that Playtime remained capable of operating within the open real estate market, and that their potential difficulties in doing so did not constitute a First Amendment
violation.65 Ultimately, the Court held that the zoning ordinance sat66
isfied the freedom of speech requirement of the First Amendment.
The dissent strongly disagreed, contending that the ordinance
was a clear content-based restriction of speech. 67 Justice Brennan refused to accept the reasoning of the majority, declaring that the ordinance blatantly discriminated on its face against adult films precisely

60 Id. (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).

61 Id. at 51.
62 Id. at 54.
63 Renton, 475 U.S. at 53.

64 Id.
65 Id. at 54. The Court further stated that:
And although we have cautioned against the enactment of zoning regulations that have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to,
lawful speech," we have never suggested that the First Amendment
compels the Government to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds
of speech-related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at
bargain prices.
Id. (quoting Am. Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. at 71).
66 Id. at 54-55.
67 Id. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 [2012], Art. 4

1080

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

because of their content.68 While adult films were restricted from being within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, school, church, or park,
other movie theaters and forms of "adult entertainment" like bars and
massage parlors, were not held to the same constraints.6 9 This underinclusion led to the conclusion that the city inexcusably enacted a
statute that treated adult theaters different from other similar businesses, in violation of the First Amendment. v°
The Supreme Court again evaluated issues of content neutrality in the context of balancing free speech with government interests
in United States v. O'Brien.7 1 In O'Brien, the Court analyzed the
constitutionality of the 1965 Amendment to the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, making it illegal to destroy Selective Service registration certificates.

2

O'Brien was convicted in the United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for publicly
burning his Selective Service registration, which he stated was meant
to be an expression of his anti-war beliefs.7 3 The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit overturned the conviction, holding that the 1965
Amendment was a freedom of speech violation.

4

The United States

Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstating the District Court's conviction.

5

68 Renton, 475 U.S. at 57.

69 Id. ("This selective treatment strongly suggests that Renton was interested not in controlling the 'secondary effects' associated with adult businesses, but in discriminating against
adult theaters based on the content of the films they exhibit.").
71 Id. at 57.
7

391 U.S. 367 (1968).

72 Id. at 370.

71 Id. at 369-70.
74

Id. at 371.

71 Id. at 372.
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O'Brien argued that the 1965 Amendment violated his right to
freedom of speech because his war protest demonstration was a "
'communication of ideas by conduct.' ,76 The Court refused to accept this argument, warning against an "apparently limitless variety
of conduct" that could potentially be allowed by applying O'Brien's
reasoning.7 7 In addition, the Court contended that even if O'Brien's
actions constituted a communication, it did not mean that they were
automatically protected by the First Amendment. 78

The Court

viewed the action as containing both speech and nonspeech elements
and considered whether there was a "sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element [to] justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.

79

The Court articulated a test of three factors to be analyzed in
the evaluation of whether a government regulation is justified, including: if it advances a significant governmental interest; if the suppression of speech did not relate to the interest; and if any restriction on
the freedom of speech is only as much as is required by the government interest advanced.80

In applying these factors to the 1965

Amendment, the Court found that all three were met, allowing the
federal government to legally punish O'Brien for violating it.81
Despite O'Brien's argument that registration certificates were

76 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
77 Id.
78 id.
79 Id. at 376-77 ("To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong.").
so Id. at 377.
81 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 [2012], Art. 4

1082

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

merely meant as notices to those who receive them, the Court
adopted the State's position that these certificates served numerous
practical purposes comprising a substantial governmental interest in
raising a strong army.82 In addition, the Court found that the 1965
Amendment was sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect this interest
without unnecessarily suppressing any freedoms.83 The scope of the
amendment was deemed to be solely aimed at preventing harm to the
Selective Service System, and employed the least restrictive means to
that goal.84 Furthermore, the conduct barred by the amendment was
non-communicative in nature and not restricted with the purpose of
suppressing speech.85 This was distinguished from a statute struck
down from the same court that made it illegal to show opposition to
the government through the display of a flag, banner, or similar exhibition.86 In upholding the 1965 Amendment, the Court held that the
amendment was focused on non-communicative conduct harmful to a
legitimate and important governmental interest, and any suppression
of communicative speech was merely ancillary.87
In contrast to the federal approach, New York takes a slightly

82 Id. at 378-80. Among these purposes are: proof that the individual has registered for
the draft; a simplification of the system by facilitation of communication between registrants
and boards; a reminder to the registrant of procedure in the case of any changes in his status;
and the furtherance of a regulatory scheme designed to minimize forgery and other abuses.
Id.
"- Id. at 381-82.
84 Id. at 381 ("We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly
assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates than a law which
prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction.").
85 Id. ("When O'Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he
wilfully frustrated this governmental interest. For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted.").
86 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
87 Id.
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broader approach than the federal courts when analyzing freedom of
speech issues. In 600 West

1 1 5th

Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld,88 Von

Gutfeld was the president of a condominium's board of managers,
and then a member of the board's building committee. 89 During his
time as president of the board, he repeatedly complained about problems with a restaurant on the ground floor of the building, which was
owned by the plaintiff corporation.9" The dispute that led to this action arose from a proposal to create a sidewalk caf&adjacent to that
restaurant. 91 Von Gutfeld testified at a public hearing about the pro92
posal and made several strong statements in opposition to it.
The community board subsequently voted against the proposal and the plaintiff filed a defamation suit against Von Gutfeld for
his statements during the hearing.93 Von Gutfeld moved for summary
judgment, contending that his statements were not factual assertions
but rather protected speech under both the U.S. Constitution and the
New York Constitution. 94 The New York Court of Appeals interpreted the freedom of speech protection from the New York Constitution to be different from that owed by the U.S. Constitution.95
The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Milk-

88

603 N.E.2d 930 (N.Y. 1992).

89 Id. at 931.
90 Id.
91 Id.

92 Id. (" 'Why do they want to do it? Because they have an illegal lease with Coronet
[plaintiffs prior landlord] that said they could take the sidewalk. Therefore, this entire lease
and proposition ... is as fraudulent as you can get and it smells of bribery and corruption.'
11).

9' Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d at 932.
94 Id.

95 Id.
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ovich v. Lorain Journal Co.9 6 to aid them in determining whether
Von Gufeld's statements were opinions or facts, in order to decide
whether they were afforded protection under the First Amendment.97
The Milkovich test advocates courts to: (1) define the words as they
are commonly understood; (2) decide if the statement was subject to
verification; and (3) see if the expression fell into a certain protected
type of speech, such as hyperbole or figurative.98 If a statement falls
into the third type of speech, the fact that it was also meant to be verified can be negated. 99 The court used federal precedent to formulate
a test of "[w]hat circumstances, in addition to the literal text of the
communication, would the reasonable reader or listener perceive and
use in determining whether or not a factual assertion was being
made?" 100
The court held that Von Gutfeld's remarks, when taken in the
context with which they were made, were protected by the U.S. Constitution.' 01 The court analyzed each specific phrase, the meaning of
each word, whether they were verifiable, and then the "general tenor"
of the remarks. 10 2 The only phrases that required serious contemplation by the court were Von Gutfeld's assertion that the restaurant was
" 'as fraudulent as you can get and [that] it smells of bribery and corruption.'

,,103

The court considered the exact choice of words, espe-

96 497 U.S. 1 (1990).

97 Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d at 934.
98 Id. at 934-35.
99 Id. at 935.

100 Id.
'0' Id. at 937.
102 Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d at 937.
103 Id.
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cially the colloquialism of the phrase "smells of' and the atmosphere
of a heated public hearing, along with the lack of a specific reference
to the plaintiff or any other actual people. 0 4 If you take the general
tone of the remarks, and the environment they were said in, as a
whole, no reasonable person could conclude that they were meant as
actual factual assertions.'0°
After performing the federal analysis, the court noted that under New York law there is a slightly different approach.'0 6 New
York law focuses on " 'the content of the whole communication, its
tone and apparent purpose.' ,,107 The purpose of the change from the
federal standard was to avoid the "fine parsing" of that test, and take
a more abstract approach that afforded a greater preservation of free
speech rights.'0 8 Under the state analysis, the court also found that
Von Gutfeld's statements were merely a form of opinion, and thus
not subject to liability for defamation.10 9
The right to free speech is one so sacred in America that the
founding fathers felt it necessary to declare it in the very first
amendment to the United States Constitution.

0

The power to ex-

press your ideas without fear of recrimination is perhaps the arche104

Id. ("This is not the language of someone inviting reasonable persons at a heated pub-

lic hearing to find specific factual allegations in his remarks. Indeed, the figurative 'smells
of by its nature conveys to listeners that he has no hard facts, only generalized suspicions.").
105 Id. ("We note as well the general tenor of the remarks. Von Gutfeld's statement is a
rambling, table-slapping monologue, much of it dealing with his past problems with the restaurant and his frustration with the government of New York City. It could not reasonably
be heard as a factual presentation ....
106 Id. at 938.
107 Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d at 938 (quoting Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d
1270 (N.Y. 1991)).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110

-

U.S. CONST.

amend. I.
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type of our freedom as a nation. This right should not be interpreted
to mean that any utterance is afforded immunity, simply because we
have the right to voice our opinions. Defamation laws, for example,
exist because there is no value to society in allowing people to harm
others' reputations by spreading blatant falsities. Justice Holmes famously stated that, "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."''"
Speech does not have to be content-based in order to be constitutionally protected. As exhibited in Ward, even content-neutral
speech is protected if it satisfies several requirements set forth by the
Supreme Court.'

12

The government can regulate the time, place, or

manner of speech if it is content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve an
important state interest, and leaves open alternative channels for
3
communication of the information.' 1
Applying that standard to Parkhouse,it becomes clear that the
court analyzed the case appropriately. The purpose for the subpoena
in Parkhouse was to further investigate the procedures at the public
hearing, and not to delve into any specific content that the speaker
expressed."

4

In addition, the government's interest in protecting and

improving the procedure at public hearings is definitely a substantial
one, and finding out more information about Parkhouse's testimony
was narrowly tailored to furthering that governmental interest. As for

111Schenck v. United

States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

112 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.

113Id.
114Parkhouse, 863 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
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alternate channels of communication, Parkhouse was free to testify at
any public hearing of her choosing, and in fact none of her speech
was suppressed." 5 The DOI simply wanted to find out more information about the procedural aspects of her testimony, which would
actually promote speech, rather than chill it." 6
Often, the question becomes whether the statement is one of
fact or one of opinion. Disseminating blatantly false factual assertions holds no constitutional protection.'

17

In Parkhouse, the gov-

ernment argued that the First Amendment analysis was irrelevant,
since her statements consisted solely of false misrepresentations.'1
In addition to making clear that public hearings are expressions of
free speech, the New York Court of Appeals has articulated its own
standard for interpreting the demarcation between an opinion and a
false factual assertion in regards to both federal and New York constitutional law.' 9
Applying either standard, it can be argued whether Parkhouse's statement was actionable. On the one hand, she did not make
any blatantly false accusations toward anyone. On the other hand,
she clearly misrepresented herself. However, it is difficult to argue
that Parkhouse's statement was one that represented her own ideas, or
that the DOI's actions would result in a chilling effect for speech.
While the suppression of speech should always be an absolute last re-

115Id. at 406 ("Here, there is simply no evidence in the record that petitioner was censored

or harassed at LPC's hearing.").
116
117

I Is

id.
Herbert, 441 U.S. at 171.
Parkhouse,863 N.Y.S.2d at 405.

n9 Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d at 932.
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sort, and subject to the highest scrutiny possible, the Parkhouse decision makes it clear that no suppression had occurred and that there
was no undue infringement of her First Amendment rights.
The famed justice Learned Hand once said that the First
Amendment " 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but
we have staked upon it our all.' ,,120 The right to freedom of speech,
along with the other freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights, com121
prise the fundamental rights that form the foundation of America.
This inalienable right is the embodiment of what some like to call the
"beacon of light"1 22 that is this country, and as such must be analyzed
so as to always err on the side of bestowing the most extensive interpretation of rights as the law can allow. However, as demonstrated in
Parkhouse, it cannot be used as a shield for those seeking to misrepresent themselves, or spread harmful falsities, or attempt in any way
to subvert the true purpose of the First Amendment while hiding under its veil.
Alyssa Dunn

120

Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d at 934 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.

Supp. 362, 372) (D.C.N.Y. 1943).
121 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
122 Barack Obama, American Leadership Television Ad Transcript (July 15th, 2008),
available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/post/laurinmanning/gGxkqk ("We
are a beacon of light around the world. At least that's what we can be again. That's what we
should be again.").
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Dunn: FIRST AMENDMENT

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
United States Constitution Amendment XI:
The Judicialpower of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
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